To Russia, with love
Since we are in the business of countering disinformation and promoting quality public discourse, Russian propaganda related to the aggression against Ukraine interests us greatly. It is worth studying to be able to immunize ourselves against it and to be able to oppose it - both within the free world and in Russia itself. Russian citizens have the right to know the truth about why they are currently losing their savings, their favorite lifestyles, and often their lives or the lives of their loved ones.
Many citizen organizations have recently tried to reach out to Russia with real info. A group of Polish hackers, known as Squad303, created a simple tool that can be used to write to random Russians on WhatsApp, which is still legal in Russia. Modern translation tools based on deep machine learning, such as deepl.com, allow you to get into such a conversation without knowing Russian. Lithuanian site Call Russia allows one to start a phone conversation with a random person (though in this case speaking Russian will be necessary). It is also possible to chat with ordinary Russian citizens on the game platforms they frequent. If you would like to join the volunteers who are trying to show the tragedy of war in Ukraine to ordinary Russians, or if you are just curious how such conversations might go, in this post we will show you some of the answers that Optimum Pareto's friend received on one gaming platform (you can also let us know in the comments which gaming platforms and other Internet meeting places are good avenues to reach out to Russians).
Using these answers as examples, we will show what errors in reasoning and manipulation a significant number of them were based on. This will also prevent a Russian interlocutor from surprising you with previously unknown claims, fact-checking which takes not only time and skill, but also a lot of general knowledge of the broader historical and political context of events. Having a basic knowledge of the manipulation techniques of Russian propaganda and the factoids it uses, one can start disarming them.
Disclaimer: due to the small sample size, we are unable to say to what extent the statements whose translations we will use in this article are representative. Polls indicate that anti-Ukrainian views or rationalizations for aggression against Ukraine are unfortunately widespread in Russian society. This should come as no surprise, given the now almost complete suppression of the free media and the massive propaganda efforts of the Putinist government. With this post we don't want to judge Russians, even those expressing such views. We simply want to help volunteers convince them to confront reality.
A few themes recur in the responses we receive from Russians who support the war: the alleged fascist leanings of Ukrainians or of the Ukrainian authorities; the need to end the war in Donbass; the alleged threat from NATO, including conspiracy theories about NATO/Ukrainian weapons of mass destruction; and finally, the belief that the Russians themselves know better what is happening in Ukraine than their foreign interlocutor. In this blogpost series we will take a look at each of these in turn, analyzing the logical errors and argumentative abuses committed.
THE MYTH OF WAR AGAINST FASCISM
“Russian troops are not attacking Ukraine - they are LIBERATING it!!! From fascism!” - writes one of Daniel's interlocutors. The belief that Ukraine is ruled by Nazis/fascists/nationalists (terms used interchangeably by the Russian propaganda) persists in many of the answers we received. Unfortunately, it is also a popular myth in the circles of the Western far left, so it is worth dismantling with some care.
Let's start with the genesis of this myth. The claim that every supporter of Ukrainian independence is a Nazi/fascist dates back to Soviet propaganda and the infamous Ukrainian Insurgent Army (UIA), which was indeed an extreme nationalist organization responsible for, among other things, the Volhynia Genocide. The UIA and related organizations regarded the USSR and Poland as their main enemies. The regular Ukrainian army fought side by side with the Polish army in the 1918-1920 Polish-Soviet war, but after the Peace of Riga, Ukraine was betrayed by the Poles and dismantled by Poland and the USSR. As a result, the eastern parts of Ukraine were annexed by the USSR and the western parts were annexed by Poland. In 1941 and later in 1944-47, the Ukrainian Insurgent Army (UPA) fought against the Soviets to secure Ukrainian independence. Yet they also collaborated with teh Nazis and engaged in ethnic cleansing in the name of the principle "There is no cruelty too great for a nation's independence not to be worth it", slaughtering tens of thousands of Volhynia Poles.
Given this historical background, it was convenient and somewhat plausible for the Soviets to present all opponents of their rule in Ukraine as UIA and their heirs. Meanwhile Ukrainian patriots, looking for pro-independence, anti-Soviet/Russian role models, often fondly reminisced about UIA as resistance fighters who actually fought the Soviets. One can indeed find monuments to the UIA leaders in western Ukraine. This may seem appalling at first, but is in fact a common case of a nation choosing to remember the good side of their historical figures while forgetting the bad one. Britain adores Churchill the wartime leader, not Churchill the colonialist; Americans admire Jefferson the philosopher, not Jefferson the slaver. Furthermore, that figures such as George Armstrong Custer also have their monuments in the USA. Although the recent events of the BLM movement have prompted critical discussion of the role of monuments and historical memory for national identity, it is still not common even in developed, democratic societies (although we certainly agree that it should be otherwise) to be critical of people whose effigies stand on pedestals. Ukrainians, looking for models of national identity, preferred to remember the UIA's fight against the Soviets, not their crimes. However, this does not translate into support for all the political ideas of that movement, which nowadays functions more of a symbol than an actual, deep inspiration - and is actually much less present than portrayed in Russian propaganda.
Equating every supporter of Ukrainian independence and sovereignty with the nationalist criminals of 70 years ago, simply because they share the goal of securing Ukrainian independence, is an obvious manipulation. Moreover, if such an irrational standard were applied equally to all, Russian patriots or nationalists should also automatically be considered supporters of a criminal regime in bed with the Nazis. After all, the USSR was a signatory to the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact, and UIA had a counterpart in General Vlasov’s Russian Liberation Army fighting on the side of the Third Reich. This would, of course, be absurd - like most Ukrainians, most Russians involved in World War II fought on the side of the Allies in the ranks of the Red Army, and both peoples and both countries suffered similar sacrifices for victory, and were brutally victimized by the Germans (Ukrainians even more so). However, it was not the Ukrainians who established a genocidal totalitarian regime in pre- and post-war Russia, but the Russians in Ukraine. Between 1932 and 1933, in retaliation for the war against Soviet Russia, the Communist authorities starved to death several million Ukrainians (the exact number of victims is difficult to estimate, with figures varying between 3 and 12 million). If the game of attributing the guilt of their collective great-grandparents to people living today is to be taken seriously, then it is the Russians who should be considered guilty of the original sin of totalitarianism. On the other hand, this would be an obviously unfair and irrational approach.
Russia has been playing with the false equivalence of Ukrainian patriotism and UIA up until today, pointing to the representatives of the few Ukrainian extreme right as allegedly representative of the whole society and decisive in political issues. Meanwhile, none of the 5 parties that crossed the 5 percent electoral threshold in the 2019 parliamentary elections can be described as far-right. The exception could be made for the pro-Russian, pro-Putin and now outlawed party "Opposition Platform - For Life" - but this was the party making accusations of ‘fascism’, not being the object of those). The coalition of far-right parties, including the Azov Movement, received about 2% support - a result much lower than the support for the far-right in key Western countries such as the US, France and Germany. Meanwhile, Volodimir Zhelezny, a comedian and actor of Jewish origin, was elected president, as is widely known, with 73% of the vote. The very fact of Ukraine organizing democratic elections, in which a man previously unconnected with politics came to power, makes one doubt the accusation of fascism leveled against the Ukrainian authorities. These charges ring especially hollow when made by the Russian state, where elections are not free, and leading opposition figures are either killed, as Boris Nemtsov, or end up as political prisoners, as Aleksandr Navalny (recently sentenced to another 9 years in a penal colony).
This stark contrast allows one to identifyt, and at the same time refute, the hidden premise of the argument from the alleged fascism of the Ukrainian government. Even if the Ukrainian government was indeed fascist - that is, if it was violating the human and civil rights of all or some of Ukraine's residents for specific ideological reasons - this would still not mean that Russia has the right, the will, and the ability to remedy the situation. An undemocratic state will have neither the will nor the ability to build a functioning democracy on the territory of its conquered neighbor; a state that notoriously violates human rights cannot promote them elsewhere. Therefore, when we look at the Ukrainian government’s track record in the context of such rhetoric, we must compare it not to some ethical or political ideal, but to the alternative actually presented by Russia. Ukraine does not have to be a model of liberal democracy for the argument for "liberating" its citizens from "fascism" to lose its power. It is enough for Ukraine not to fall behind Russia on key metrics for this rhetoric not to apply.
So how do the two countries compare in terms of respect for human rights, fundamental civil liberties, the rule of law or the level of corruption? In the World Justice Project's Rule of Law Index, Ukraine (74) is ahead of Russia (101). In the Human Freedom Index, compiled by the libertarian-conservative Cato Institute, Ukraine (98) is also ahead of Russia (126). In Transparency International's Corruption Perceptions Index, Ukraine is 129th and Russia is 136th. In the Worldwide Press Freedom Index by Reporters Without Borders, Ukraine is 97th and Russia is 150th. Finally, in the Democracy Index of The Economist magazine, Ukraine is listed with a score of 5.81/10 and the classification 'hybrid system' (located between democracy and authoritarianism), while Russia received a score of 3.31/10 and is unequivocally classified as an authoritarian state. None of these rankings contradict the claim that Ukraine faces serious problems, including in the areas of rule of law, civil liberties or even respect for basic human rights. What is clear, however, is that in each of these aspects, Ukraine is a) within or above the regional norm b) performs equally to or better than Russia.. The trajectory of change in both countries is also important - while Ukraine strives for reform and tries to join the world of democracy, Russia sinks into an ever heavier authoritarianism (a process rapidly accelerated by its aggression against Ukraine).
Thus neither Ukrainian patriotic and independence movement, nor the current Ukrainian government can be considered fascist, or even particularly imperfect compared to Russia or other countries in the region. Consequently Russian propaganda tries to point to certain individuals, groups or incidents, and portray them as more frequent or more representative than they really are. As I mentioned earlier, Ukraine is not - and does not have to be - an ideal country. The phenomenon of far-right radicalism exists there, just like in other European countries or in the US. Far-right groups, or those using far-right symbolism, also played a not unremarkable role during the Dignity Revolution of 2013-14, as well as during the first phase of the war in Donbass, providing some of the personnel of the so-called volunteer battalions. These were armed citizen militias spontaneously formed by Ukrainian patriots to assist the regular Ukrainian army in fighting similar militias of pro-Russian separatists and the Russian army fighting without proper insignia. In 2016, Azov and other battalions were incorporated into the Ukrainian National Guard, though undoubtedly retaining a separate character and a degree of autonomy.
It is the existence of these formations, especially the Azov Battalion, which has fascist symbols in its official emblem and openly supports UIA’s genocidal program of the 1930s in its pamphlets, that is the basis for the contemporary narrative of Ukrainian fascism. If the Azov regiment were representative of the armed forces or the Ukrainian government, this narrative would essentially be true. But is Azov a reflection of Ukrainian society as a whole?
The representatives of the Azov regiment themselves would definitely like us to see themselves that way - in a Financial Times article they speak of tens of thousands of volunteers in the original regiment, now confined to the besieged city of Mariupol, and politically connected units of the same name fighting near Kiev and after Kharkiv. This is how Russian propagandists would like to see them as well. However, in reality all three units consist of only a few thousand men (the personnel of the original Azov regiment, fighting in Mariupol, is estimated at 900 to 2,500 soldiers before taking into account substantial losses incurred since February 24th). This number may seem large, but given that the total size of Ukraine's armed forces is now at least 350,000 soldiers, the various units operating under the banner of "Azov" constitute 1-1.5% of the total Ukrainian forces. They are also, without exception, light infantry units, and thus peripheral and auxiliary to the Ukrainian war effort, and have no heavy equipment. Even if one were to assume that every soldier in these units shared the political postulates of their leaders, which is a big if, it would still be impossible to conclude that the Ukrainian forces as a whole were dominated or infiltrated by the far right.
Summing up: like most European countries, Ukraine has a dark history of extreme nationalism, involvement in genocide and collaboration with the Nazis, and as in most European countries, some of its citizens view this period of their country's history through a way too forgiving lens. This does not change the fact that support for the far right is lower in present-day Ukraine than in many of the much more mature democracies of the West; that its newly elected government is headed by a democratically elected political newbie of Jewish descent; and that standards of human and civil rights enforcement are no different from the average for the post-Soviet space, improving steadily, in contrast to Russia’s trajectory. 1 in 100 soldiers of the Ukrainian armed forces are serving in volunteer militia units founded by far right organizations; these were formed in the first chaotic days of the 2014 war amid the helplessness of the Ukrainian state, and their activities have since been subject to some oversight, although not to a sufficient degree. However, these units are in no way representative of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, although they themselves attempt to create such a narrative. Their existence and use is perhaps best compared to the use of Shiite militias by Iraq in the war against the Islamic State - a step forced by the necessity of war, which does not at all indicate a friendly attitude of the authorities towards such units or far right ideas.
The myth of ubiquitous Ukrainian fascism is a worn-out trope of Russian propaganda, based mostly on exaggerating the importance and harmfulness of marginal groups, completely illegitimate attempts to equate contemporary Ukrainian independence efforts with the activities of Ukrainian nationalists 70 years ago, and above all, the use of double standards. Ukraine is not a perfect country; it is a young, highly imperfect democracy, still struggling with the legacy of Soviet totalitarianism and post-Soviet corruption. Nevertheless, when judged against the background of semi-totalitarian, neo-imperialist Russia, Ukraine is a model to follow to fellow post-Soviet republics.
Dante Fajfer fact-checked the fact-checker and contributed historical insight.
